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I. INTRODUCTION
April 14, 2003 marked the beginning of a new era in America's
healthcare industry. Gone are the days of unlimited access to patient
health care information by members of the heath care professional
community. Instead, as of April 14, 2003,1 access or exchange of the
sensitive data may occur only under the conditions outlined in a com-
plex new regulatory scheme referred to as the Privacy Rule. 2 The
Rule, meant to safeguard health information privacy, is an offshoot of
health care directives provided by the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).3
This Article explores how well the Rule protects patient privacy,
particularly in the context of permissible disclosures that a consumer
might regard as commercial marketing. Part I introduces the issue by
explaining the implementation of the initial Privacy Rule and its mod-
ified version under HIPAA. Part II briefly familiarizes the reader with
the complexity of defining privacy and establishes which definition to
use in analyzing the Rule. Part III evaluates the Rule as a whole, de-
termining whether the move from consent in the initial Rule to mere
notice about information disclosures in the modified Rule adequately
protects privacy. This Article then highlights the effectiveness of the
Rule's notice requirements in connection with disclosures under three
types of circumstances - treatment, payment, and health care opera-
tions. Deciphering the last category reveals the serious infractions
created by the ability to mask commercial marketing under the guise
of health care operations. Part IV summarizes the major concerns and
provides practical solutions to shore up patient privacy.
II. NEED FOR A PRIVACY RULE
Congressional intent in enacting HIPAA was to ensure continued
health insurance coverage for those who changed jobs or insurance
1. 45 C.F.R. § 164.534 (2001) (the "Rule" or the "Privacy Rule") (the regulations pro-
vide an additional year's grace for small health plans).
2. Id. at §§ 164.500 to 164.534 (Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Information). A companion set of regulations (the Security Rule) dictates
in greater detail how entities are to maintain the security of the information they
will hold and transmit. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302 to 164.318 (2003). Many work-
shops, for example, have been and will be offered to prepare industry, and their
attorneys for the changes brought about by the Rule. E.g., "HIPAA for Real Peo-
ple - the Series" (5 part series presented in early 2003 by the ABA Health Law
Section, in conjunction with others) at www.abanet.org/healthl (2003).
3. Health Ins. Portability and Accountabiliy Act of 1996 (HIPPA), Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (also known as the Kassebaum-Kennedy Act) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.A.).
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policies 4 and to reduce "waste, fraud and abuse in health insurance
and health care delivery."5 A driving force of the Act was to reduce
cost and increase efficiency within the health care system, at least as
it related to billing6 and maintaining health insurance coverage,
meant to safeguard health privacy as electronic storage and transmis-
sion of the information has increased the nation's vulnerability to
exposure.
Implementation of the statutory purpose was to be accomplished
by means of an "Administrative Simplification" of records requiring a
computerized infrastructure to maintain and transmit records elec-
tronically. Of necessity, a unique health care identifier would need to
link the amassed health care information with the individual who was
the subject of the information. 7 The need, really, the requirement,
that information pass quickly between agencies via the digitized net-
works of electronic storage and transmission meant an increased ex-
posure to unauthorized access to the information with a resultant
increased need for privacy protection.8 The industry was already
plagued by scandalous leaks that had seriously undermined the pub-
lic's trust.9 Further exposure necessitated protective action to win the
4. Scott J. Kelly, The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996:
Medicare Fraud Advisory Opinion Mandate Sends the Inspector General " Shop-
ping for Hats," 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 316 (1998).
5. HIPAA (Preamble), 110 Stat. 1936 [hereinafter Preamble].
6. HIPAA, 110 Stat. 1936; See also 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (Supp. 1999) ("encouraging
use of electronic medical records"); HIPAA, 110 Stat. 2033, § 264(a) (1996) ("re-
quiring promulgation of regulations of 'standards with respect to the privacy of
individually identifiable health information' by the Department of Health and
Human Services if Congress did not act"); Henry T. Greely, Trusted Systems and
Medical Records: Lowering Expectations, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1585, 1587-88 (2000).
7. Eric Wymore, It's 1998, Do You Know Where Your Medical Records Are? Medical
Record Privacy After the Implementation of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, 19 HAMLINE J. Pus. L. & POL'Y 553, 566-568 (1998); 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-8 (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a), (d) (1998) (requiring the Secre-
tary of the Dept. of Health and Human Services to promulgate security standards
to protect health information).
8. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, et al., Balancing Communal Goods and Personal Pri-
vacy Under a National Health Informational Privacy Rule, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 5,
6 (2002); see also Rob Reilly, Conceptual Foundations of Privacy: Looking Back-
ward Before Stepping Forward, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 6, *3 (1999).
9. See, e.g., Paul Starr, Health and the Right to Privacy, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 193,
197 (1999); Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information
[hereinafter Preamble], at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/Pvc-
Pre01.htm (2000).
20041
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
trust and resultant cooperation of the public.1O Thus, protecting indi-
vidual privacy became a secondary "other purpose" of the Act."1
The recognition that increased privacy protection is needed in a
digital world is hardly unique to the United States. Worldwide, most
view privacy in general as a basic human right.12 To safeguard the
right of privacy, many countries have adopted generic legislation that
protects all forms of privacy. The United States, by contrast, takes a
piecemeal approach.13 In accord with a perceived need for the protec-
tion of personal health information, Congress mandated that specifics
be hammered out either in Congress directly, or, in the event that no
consensus could be reached in enacting companion legislation,
through agency rulemaking.14
Despite several bills, Congress failed to enact personal health pri-
vacy legislation. Some have suggested that conservative camps, asso-
ciated with industry more than with plaintiffs whose personal
information would be the subject of the legislative efforts, stymied the
progress. Political conservatives have been accused of employing rhet-
oric to achieve the desired result of squashing legislation, arguing
somewhat opposite positions that current protections are adequate
and also that suggested language was both "too broad" and "without
10. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Informa-
tion, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 69-70 (1997); Standards for Privacy of Individually Identi-
fiable Health Information (preamble), http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/
PvcPre0l.htm (2002) ("Unless public fears are allayed, we will be unable to ob-
tain the full benefits of electronic technologies.") ("administrative simplification
cannot succeed if we do not also protect the privacy and confidentiality of per-
sonal health information").
11. A. Craig Eddy, Critical Analysis of Health and Human Services' Proposed Health
Privacy Regulations in Light of the Health Insurance Privacy and Accountability
Act of 1996, 9 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 17 (2000).
12. David Banisar, Privacy and Human Rights 2000, at http:ll
www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2000 (last visited April 22, 2002); see
also James D. Molenaar, The HIPAA Privacy Rule: It Helps Direct Marketers Who
Help Themselves to Your Personal Health Information, 2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. U.
DET C.L. 855 (2002) (demonstrating privacy is a fundamental right in the United
States as well).
13. John D. Blum, The Role of Law in Global E-Health: A Tool for Development and
Equity in a Digitally Divided World, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 85, 97 (2002). For an
example of some legislative efforts, see Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Com-
puter Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, STAN. L. REV. 1393,
1440-44 (2001). See also Gostin, supra note 8, at 13-14 (describing various pri-
vacy statutes); and Lawrence 0. Gostin, et al., The Nationalization of Health In-
formation Privacy Protections, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 1113, 1121-1122 (2002)
(describing their weaknesses).
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (1999); Bartley L. Barefoot, Enacting a Health Informa-
tion Confidentiality Law: Can Congress Beat the Deadline? 77 N.C. L. REV. 283,
315-16 (1998).
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new 'real' protections."15 Upon the passing of the requisite time with-
out effective Congressional action, the responsibility for promulgating
the appropriate rules automatically fell to the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) to complete the Congressional work.16
The final rules promulgated by the HHS fall within the Adminis-
trative Data Standards and Related Requirements subchapter,17 and
include regulations specifically related to privacy.' 8 The regulations
apply to defined "covered entities," which include health plans, health
care clearinghouses, and health care providers who transmit health
information electronically. 19 Of particular concern is the individually
identifiable health information, termed "protected health informa-
tion," or PHI.20 The preamble to the regulations discusses privacy is-
sues at length. To what extent does the Rule protect individual
privacy? Is the protection adequate or even a primary objective of the
Rule?21 The Rule has been given mixed reviews, from offering the
most advanced to the most anti-privacy protections in years.2 2
Close examination of the regulatory provisions suggests that the
Rule likely affords adequate protection in the context of treatment and
payment. By contrast, the Rule inadequately protects individual pri-
vacy under the rubric of health care operations.23 Within that struc-
15. Richard S. Fedder, To Know or Not to Know: Legal Perspectives on Genetic Pri-
vacy and Disclosure of an Individual's Genetic Profile, 21 J. LEGAL. MED. 557,
558-59 (2000). Conservatives are thought to be aligned with defense interests
and defense interests have "potent influence on judicial outcomes." (More so than
plaintiff-friendly lobbying efforts). See Ray B. Flemming, Contested Terrains and
Regime Politics: Thinking About America's Trial Courts and Institutional
Change, 23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 941, 959 (1998); Anita Bernstein, The New-Tort
Centrifuge, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 413, 424 (1999), (citing Ralph Nader, Lawyers and
Law Students as Tools of Democracy, 17 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 5 (1995)).
16. HIiPAA § 264(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 n.2.
17. 45 C.F.R. Parts 160-164 (2001).
18. 45 CFR §§ 164.102-164.534 (2001).
19. Id. at § 164.104. Groups such as life insurers and workers' compensation insurers
are not entities governed by the Rule. Gostin, et al., supra note 13, at 1126.
20. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (defining PHI). In addition, e-commerce sites that sell prod-
ucts or offer health advice may not fall within the regulatory framework.
Nicholas Terry, Regulating Health Information: A US Perspective, 324 BRIT. MED.
J. 602, 604 (2002), available at http:/www.bmj.com.
21. See Preamble, supra note 9 ("Unless public fears are allayed, we will be unable to
obtain the full benefits of electronic technologies.") ("administrative simplifica-
tion cannot succeed if we do not also protect the privacy and confidentiality of
personal health information"). This suggests that the primary purpose is not pri-
vacy at all, but merely the illusion of privacy in order to acquire the public's trust
so that the efficiency objectives of the Rule could be achieved.
22. Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad for Your Health? An Introduction to the
Law, Ethics, and HIPAA Rule on Medical Privacy, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 481, 511-
12 (2000) (quoting Health Privacy Project director Janlori Goldman, privacy ad-
vocate Robert Gellman, and the ACLU).
23. Scott, supra note 22, at 511 (citing the Health Privacy Project and describing
loopholes in the marketing provisions).
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ture, many transactions that lay consumers would consider marketing
are hidden under the complexities of "health care operations." De-
scriptions of disclosure practices contained within the entity notice are
unlikely to render consumers fully aware of the purposes sanctioned
by the Rule or of the extent to which their private information is dis-
seminated. This, coupled with an inability to control the process,
strongly suggests that the Rule, in the context of this disguised mar-
keting, inadequately protects privacy.
The Rule underwent several transformations during the adminis-
trative process that lead to its initial publication as a Final Rule. 24
Then, the initial Final Rule morphed again.25 The discussion that fol-
lows examines both the initial and the later versions of the Final Rule
and demonstrates that the latter version not only fails to cure, it fur-
ther erodes privacy.
III. PRIVACY DEFINED
Privacy cannot be summed up in a single definition. 26 The word
"privacy" could refer to the right to make intimate decisions, the right
to limit or be free from access to one another, or the right to maintain
secrecy.2 7 The autonomous decision-making aspect of privacy is best
understood by reference to the series of reproductive liberty cases be-
ginning with Griswold v. Connecticut.28 The second aspect of privacy
is perhaps best reflected in the intrusion upon seclusion privacy tort.
The foundation for the tort is the right to be "let alone,"29 which
grants each person a right to exclude others from some physical or
24. 67 Fed. Reg. 53182-01 (2002) (outlining the historical progression).
25. See 67 Fed. Reg. 53182-01 (2002) (noting that the Final Rule was modified on
August 14, 2002, with the effective date of the modifications as Oct. 15, 2002). In
between the initial and modified version were the proposed changes, some of
which were adopted by the modified version of the Rule. See INSTITUTE FOR
HEALTH CARE RESEARCH AND POLICY, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, HEALTH PRIVACY
PROJECT, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR
PRIVACY ON INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH INFORMATION (2002), available at
http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr-doc/NPRMHPPComments.pdf. (2002) (com-
menting on the proposed changes to the Rule).
26. See generally, LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RE-
STRAINT 127-142 (2000) (describing types of privacy, the development of trust,
and fair information practices).
27. JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56 (1992); see also Jean L.
Cohen, Is Privacy a Legal Duty? Reconsidering Private Right and Public Virtue in
the Domain of Intimacy, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND PHILO-
SOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 117, 133-34 (Maurizio Passerin d'ntreves & Ursula Vo-
gel eds. 2000) (describing where privacy acknowledges self-defined boundaries
with respect to physical self and communications about personal matters).
28. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH
ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 1-7, 20 (2d ed. 1888).
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mental space considered personal under the law.30 A variety of activi-
ties impacted by the intrusion tort include eavesdropping, spying, pry-
ing, and harassment.3 1  Another aspect of privacy concerns
maintaining control over the flow of information about oneself.32
Not all loss of control impacts privacy because not all information
about oneself may be considered "private." It is the information itself
that gives structure to what is or is not private. 33 If the information is
content neutral, then the desire to thwart its dissemination merely
falls within the category of secrecy. Secrecy does not impact privacy
unless the information is also intimate.34 Information about one's
health is considered "intimate."35 Thus, failure to keep secret, or
maintain the confidentiality of, health information, thereby impacts
individual privacy.
The privacy regulations focus on the latter aspect of privacy - that
of maintaining the secrecy of individuals' health information. In the
context of medical treatment, an individual must share intimate infor-
mation concerning aspects of his or her health with another who pro-
vides the treatment. Privacy is achieved by keeping this information
confidential - that is, by ensuring that further disclosure is withheld
unless for desired purposes. 3 6
IV. Privacy in an Integrated Health Care System Envisioned
by HIPAA
What are the proper and desirable purposes for which disclosure
may occur without impacting privacy? A sense of privacy correlates
with autonomy. 37 So in a large sense, the answer is in the subjective
30. June Mary Z. Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion a New Tort? 34 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 965, 988-89 (2001).
31. Id. at 985-86.
32. See Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Privacy and Confidentiality: Why They Are So
Hard to Protect, 26 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 198 (1998); A.L. Allen, Genetic Privacy:
Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31-59 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
33. INNEss, supra note 27, at 57-59.
34. See Id.
35. Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Personal Privacy and Common
Goods: A Framework for Balancing under the National Health Information Pri-
vacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. Rev. 1439, 1440 (2002); Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A
Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1085, 1149
(2002) (quoting Robert R. Blair, Redefining Information Privacy, PRIVACY J. 7
(1989)).
36. See Solove, supra note 13, at 1439; see also Lucas D. Introna, Privacy and the
Computer: Why We Need Privacy in the Information Society, in CYBERETHICS: SO-
CIAL AND MORAL ISSUES IN THE COMPUTER AGE 195 (Robert M. Baird et al. eds,
2000).
37. See Carol M. Bast, What's Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the
Law of Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 837, 900 (1998).
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view of the autonomous individual. 38 The individual could control the
information flow through informed consent, which is the prevailing
practice regarding health care in general, 39 with the extent of infor-
mation shared regulated by the degree to which the individual desires
to participate in society.40 In this case, the defined society is the or-
ganized health care system. Individualized control would mean that
the individual could determine what and how information was shared
in exchange for participation in the system. The quid pro quo would
be the individual's receipt of some benefit, in this case, health care.
The advantage of this type of "negotiated disclosure,"41 which is akin
to a private agreement between the individual and the entity receiv-
ing the individual's information, is that by granting or withholding
consent, the individual acts as a true and voluntary participant in the
system.42
In the initial final rule, the regulatory structure required the indi-
vidual's consent before entities included within the Rule's purview
could use43 or disclose 4 4 the individual's protected health information
for purposes of treatment, payment, or health care operations. 4 5
Some considered this requirement of consent highly important in pro-
viding privacy protection in disclosure-centric frameworks such as
this.46 The Rule also had a "plain language" and informational re-
quirement. This necessitated formulating a consent form that in-
formed individuals about several rights. Among these, the right to
review the entity's notice before signing the consent form47 permitted
the individual to gain insight into the entity's disclosure practices in
each of the three categories.
This format appears to be a "negotiated disclosure." That is, when
an individual executes a consent form, it evidences a private agree-
ment between the participant and the entity. Use and disclosure of
the private information is exchanged for health care services in accord
38. See RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 259-61
(1986).
39. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 35, at 1467.
40. See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
41. See Fedder, supra note 15, at 570.
42. See id.
43. A "use" refers to the sharing of PHI within an entity. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501.
44. "Disclosure" refers to information passed on to anyone outside the particular en-
tity holding the information. Id.
45. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a) (2001). Those subject to the Privacy Rule are health plans,
health care clearinghouses, and health care providers who transmit health care
information electronically in connection with a transaction covered by the Rule.
45 C.F.R. § 160.102(a) (2001). The modified Rule left this provision unchanged.
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining "covered entity") (2002).
46. See Terry, supra note 20, at 604.
47. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c) (2001). The "plain language" requirement continues in the
modified version. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2002).
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with the entity's notice. 48 If both parties exercise free choice in enter-
ing the arrangement, the Rule protects the individual's privacy be-
cause each individual appears to maintain control over the
dissemination of the private information. 4 9 Closer examination of any
consent limitations is warranted to determine the existence of negoti-
ated disclosure in reality or merely in appearance.
A. Limitations to Consent
One limitation to the effectiveness of the consent provision under
the initial final rule was evidenced by the way in which uses and dis-
closures could occur in the absence of prior consent. 50 For example,
health care providers who fit within the Rule's definition of "indirect
treatment relationship"51 had no need to obtain consent prior to use or
disclosure. 52 An illustration helps explain the significance of the dis-
tinction between direct and indirect providers.
Suppose an individual visits his or her physician. The doctor refers
the individual to another provider, 5 3 who withdraws blood and per-
forms whatever tests were ordered by the initiating physician. The
latter reports the findings to the initiating physician. Based on the
results, the physician phones in a prescription to the pharmacy se-
lected by the individual. The individual picks up the medication and
goes home.
As a direct provider, the initiating physician would have been
bound by the prior consent rules and would have been limited in his or
her use or disclosure of the individual's protected health information
without it. If either the testing provider or the pharmacist were con-
sidered a direct provider, then the same rules governing the initiating
physician's conduct would apply to each. If, on the other hand, either
were considered health care providers who delivered treatment only
indirectly, then no consent would have been needed prior to use or
48. See Fedder, supra note 15, at 570.
49. See INNESS, supra note 27, at 57; see also Rothstein, supra note 32.
50. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a)(2)-(4) (2001).
51. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001) (providing the following definition of indirect treat-
ment relationship: "(1) The health care provider delivers health care to the indi-
vidual based on the orders of another health care provider; and (2) The health
care provider typically provides services or products, or reports the diagnosis or
results associated with the health care, directly to another health care provider,
who provides the services or products or reports to the individual").
52. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a) (2001). Also excepted are instances where care is received
while an inmate. Id. at 506(a)(2)(ii).
53. Provider is defined quite broadly, incorporating definitions within 42 U.S.C.
1395x(u) and 42 U.S.C. 1395x(s) as well as "any other person or organization who
furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in the normal course of business." 45
C.F.R. § 160.103 (2001) (defining health care provider).
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disclosure for payment, treatment, or operations purposes. 5 4 The dis-
tinction between direct and indirect treatment relationships is that in
the latter, care is provided as a result of another's orders, and the ser-
vice, product, or treatment result typically passes to the initiating pro-
vider, who then supplies them directly to the individual. 55
Under the initial final rule, a direct treatment relationship is likely
to exist between the individual and the pharmacist. The Rule in-
cludes as health care providers anyone "who furnishes, bills, or is paid
for health care in the normal course of business."5 6 Since health care
includes the "sale or dispensing of a drug . . . in accordance with a
prescription,"57 this naturally includes pharmacists. Although the
pharmacist supplies medical care pursuant to a physician's orders, he
or she typically passes the medication on to the consuming individual
directly. Therefore, the pharmacist would have a direct treatment re-
lationship with the individual and be bound by the same rules as the
initiating physician who prescribed the medication.
The person who withdraws blood and subsequently performs tests
would not have had a direct treatment relationship with the individ-
ual from whom the blood was withdrawn because both prongs of the
"indirect treatment relationship" definition are satisfied. The veni-
puncture and testing are ordered by another provider, and the results
typically are passed on to individuals through the treating physicians.
Since these subsequent providers have only an indirect treatment re-
lationship with the individual, the prior consent rule would not apply;
providers with only an indirect treatment relationship could have
used or disclosed health care information for treatment, payment, or
operations purposes without the individual's consent. 58
The lack of additional consent for disclosures made in connection
with the treatment by and payment to the indirect provider may be
acceptable because consent may have been presumed. Both resulted
from the natural flow of events in connection with the patient's medi-
cal care. The patient was aware of the initial provider's determination
that further testing was necessary for good patient care and volunta-
rily undertook that further care by another provider. The natural ex-
pectation would be that information would flow to the indirect
provider specific to the patient's treatment and, moreover, that some
54. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a)(2) (2001). A discussion of governmental power to invade
privacy and whether the correct balance has been drawn between governmental
need for the information and individual privacy rights is beyond the scope of this
Article.
55. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001) (defining "direct treatment relationship" and "indirect
treatment relationship").
56. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2001) (defining "health care provider").
57. Id. (defining "health care").
58. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a)(2)(i) (2001).
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information would need to be exchanged in order that the indirect pro-
vider be paid by the patient's insurer.
The same logic may not apply with respect to information dissemi-
nated for the provider's health care operations. Unlike disseminations
made in the context of treatment or payment, health care operations
are primarily concerned with entity matters rather than with patient
care. 59 Therefore, the nature of a consumer's consent to the spread of
private information, the focus of which may not involve a benefit of
services that was the quid pro quo of entry into the health care mini-
society, differs. Here, the lay individual may be quite unaware of the
extent of allowable purposes of information dissemination. Therefore,
the individual would lack the ability to assess the trade-off between
accepting care and entity-controlled information sharing.
One might suggest that the opportunity for reasoned choice was
present, either because of a consent form signed at the time of enroll-
ing in the health care package that would eventually reimburse the
indirect provider for services, or because a savvy health care consumer
would invoke his or her right to request a notice of disclosure practices
directly from the indirect provider. 60 In the former situation, the sep-
aration in time from the original signing would likely inactivate a
level of awareness sufficient to affirm informed consent as to the later
transaction, especially since whatever was explained in the notice ac-
companying the consent form would have been of general applica-
tion,61 divorced from the current health concern or its potential
stigma. At this later point in time, the patient might not even know
what information has been made a part of his record and passed on.62
As for the latter, even if the consumer requested and digested the indi-
rect provider's notice, there would be no right to withhold consent be-
cause no consent was required.63 The individual's choice would be
limited to selecting another indirect provider to deliver the desired
services. But, to the extent that individuals have a limited choice of
caregivers or if available indirect providers employ the same practices,
then where is the voluntary exchange of information for care in the
context of health care operations?
59. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 35, at 1477-78.
60. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(a) (2001).
61. See Id. Even authorizations may fail to provide adequate privacy protections
since the forms provided for signature may be "blanket authorization[s]" allowing
for unfettered access to the unsuspecting patient's records. Scott, supra note 22,
at 490.
62. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 35, at 1467-68. Furthermore, since providers need
not limit disclosure to the minimal necessary in the treatment context, 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.502(b)(2)(i), the indirect provider may be privy to far greater information
than the individual would suspect.
63. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a)(2)(i) (2001).
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In light of the above discussion, one must conclude that uses and
disclosures connected with indirect caregivers are not negotiated. In-
stead they are permissive. 64 Permissive disclosure increases the risk
of widespread sharing of the information because the information may
be passed along without action or inaction on the part of the individ-
ual who is the subject of the information. 65 This practice, coupled
with a potential lack of justification for the initial collection of infor-
mation,6 6 magnifies vulnerability to exposure. Thus, in the absence of
individual control, privacy appears unprotected.
What about the larger context, where the initial final rules re-
quired consent in advance of uses or disclosures for treatment, pay-
ment, or health care operations? 67 At first glance, the consent
requirement suggests that the exchange of consent for participation
satisfies the elements of a voluntary negotiation between the par-
ties.68 However, the initial final rule permitted health care providers
to condition treatment on consent, and health plans to condition en-
rollment on the provision of consent.69 Consent, particularly in the
context of enrollment, may not necessarily have been voluntary.70
Individuals often have little say in selecting a health plan; choice
may be limited to pre-selected benefits offered as part of the individ-
ual's employment package. 7 1 Refusal for many may not be a viable
option. To the extent that this is true, consent would not be voluntary
despite the intentional execution of the consent form.72 To explain: If
a person is able to afford private health care without the benefit of
insurance, then that person may experience the influence, but not co-
ercive effect of the incentive to sign (in exchange for coverage).73 The
average person, however, is likely to suffer from inadequate care with-
out coverage.7 4 The latter would experience more than mere influence
64. See Fedder, supra note 15, at 570.
65. See id. at 571.
66. Gerald S. Schatz, Health Records Privacy and Confidentiality: Pending Ques-
tions, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 685, 689 (2002).
67. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a)(1) (2001).
68. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1049, 1111 (2000) (where contracts and statutory constraints against disclo-
sures may provide adequate privacy protections).
69. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b)(1), (2) (2001).
70. See Fedder, supra note 15, at 570.
71. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, SOME CHOICE: LAW, MEDICINE AND THE MARKET 46 (1998);
see also William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and
American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1731 (1999) (stating 78% of em-
ployers offer only one plan).
72. See FADEN ET AL., supra note 38, at 256-60.
73. See id. at 258-59.
74. In addition to having to pay out-of-pocket each time, the uninsured's charges may
also be significantly higher. For example, in a recent bill, the insurer, under a
contract with the provider, was charged $13.33, which was the contractually es-
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over a decision to execute the consent agreement; it would be tanta-
mount to coercion because the subject who simply cannot afford
needed care otherwise would be unable to resist the manipulation.75
The coercive nature of the arrangement indicates that privacy is not
adequately protected because the subject has insufficient control over
the exchange. 76 If the consent is not effective in controlling dissemi-
nations, then the practical effect is nothing more than providing notice
of data sharing practices. 77
In response to criticisms, 78 the Final Rule was modified on August
14, 200279 to eliminate the consent requirement.8 0 Instead, an indi-
vidual has only a limited right to notice.8 1 Therein, the individual is
tablished fee for the service. The insured was charged a mere additional $1.33.
This total was substantially less than the amount that would be owed for the
same service by an uninsured individual ($117.95). Moreover, the insurer en-
sured that extra charges that customarily get rolled into the service are elimi-
nated from a bill. "Venipuncture" is a prime example. A representative bill
charged $14.75 for the service of inserting a needle into the subject's skin for the
purpose of inserting the medication that was listed as a separate charge. An un-
insured individual, unlike an insured, would have to pay the additional charge.
(Records on file with author).
75. See FADEN ET AL., supra note 38, at 258-59. Some have criticized the Rule di-
rectly, concluding that industry practices constituted "coerced consent." Scott,
supra note 22, at 522.
76. See Gostin, et al., supra note 13, at 1132.
77. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 35, at 1468.
78. See INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH AND POLICY, supra note 26. In addi-
tion to the "forced consent" argument, segments of the health care industry have
put intense pressure on HHS to eliminate the consent requirement, complaining
of an inability to provide timely care and the burdensomeness of the paperwork.
Id. Additional concerns included inefficiency through duplication of information
provided by the Notice and in being unable to obtain advance diagnostic informa-
tion. Jennifer Guthrie, Time is Running Out - The Burdens and Challenges of
HIPAA Compliance: A Look at Preemption Analysis, the "Minimum Necessary"
Standard, and the Notice of Privacy Practices, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 143, 169
(2003).
79. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 F.R.
53182-01 (Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 and 164). The effec-
tive date of the modified Final Rule was Oct. 15, 2002. Id.
80. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2002). The modification did permit entities to seek con-
sent for use/disclosure for purposes of treatment, payment, or health care opera-
tions. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b) (2002). However, this may have been in response to
confusion over meeting the demands of the Rule as well as physician confidential-
ity ethics. See Hippocratic Oath, MosBY'S MEDICAL, NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH
DICTIONARY 817 (6th ed. 2002) (articulating a duty of confidentiality in the Oath
as "[a]ll that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my profession ...
which ought not to be spread abroad, I will keep secret . . . ."). The Health Pri-
vacy Project views the elimination of the consent requirement as undermining
autonomous decisionmaking. BNA, Business Groups Applaud Proposed Changes
in Privacy Rule; Privacy Groups Disappointed, 11 BNA's HEALTH LAw REPORTER
686 (May 9, 2002), available at http://ippubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/hlr.nsf/is/
a0a5nlu4f2 (last visited July 9, 2002).
81. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2002).
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informed of entity use and disclosure practices and participant
rights.8 2 Is mere notice sufficient to protect privacy?
B. Notice as Privacy Protector
Ideally, privacy is best protected when the subjective values of in-
dividuals allow the exchange of information for health care benefits to
be negotiated by the mechanism of informed consent.8 3 Individual-
ized control, however, presents serious consequences for discreet soci-
eties such as the organized health care system. If each participant
were permitted to define his or her own parameters regarding the flow
of information, the system itself could become inefficient8 4 and unde-
sirable.8 5 Individualized disclosure practices could result in treatment
inconsistencies or even harm. Vital communication between diagnos-
ing and treating providers could be delayed or blocked. Fraudulent
payments could not be prevented. In short, how could an organized
system fulfill the defined objectives of efficient, non-fraudulent health
care delivery8 6 if the society lacked a degree of operational uniform-
ity? How can one reconcile the uniformity needed for participation in
a closed society such as an organized health care system with main-
taining privacy?
If one considered only the subjective model of privacy, it would be
difficult to see how the two could co-exist. To end the inquiry there
would be unsatisfying. Perhaps a narrower question should be ad-
dressed that reflects the narrower context of the society defined as an
organized health care system. Participation in it, unlike a broader
form of society, requires something other than a series of non-related
interactional opportunities where one may choose at each juncture
whether to participate.8 7 In the context of an organized health care
system, such individual control over each transactional detail would
defeat the existence of the defined society. To support the society it-
self, then, full individualized control must yield. But to what? If enti-
ties that control use and disclosure of health information were to
determine all the terms of the agreement, then where is the quid pro
quo gained by the collective individuals in exchange for the health in-
formation they provide the holders? Terms of participation must in-
stead bear a resemblance to what privacy would be sacrificed in accord
with the collective desire of individual participants.
82. Id. at 520(b).
83. See Fedder, supra note 15, at 570. But see Schwartz, supra note 10, at 4 (referring
to Posner & Epstein's assertion that economic efficiency and social utility suggest
full disclosure as preferred).
84. Fedder, supra note 15, at 571.
85. Gostin, supra note 9, at 17.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1320-d n (1996).
87. See WESTIN, supra note 40, at 13, 21 (1967).
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Measurement of the collective desire poses some problem. There is
no absolute standard because choice varies with the individual. Some
may be willing to give up more information than needed for entry into
the defined society. Others would attempt to maximize beneficial in-
terests of participation and minimize the sacrifice of control over per-
sonal information.8 8
Tort law resolves the issue by defining acceptable or unacceptable
privacy loss in terms of reasonableness. Individual desire regarding
invasion of.privacy yields to the more objective measure of what Would
be highly offensive to a reasonable societal participant. 89 In more nar-
rowly defined social contexts such as the workplace, where individuals
have constructive (or actual 90 ) notice that absolute privacy does not
exist,9 1 reasonableness is further limited by employer need. For ex-
ample, suppose the employing entity wished to install surveillance
cameras to prevent theft or to require drug testing to maintain a drug-
free environment. If the expressed needs were legitimate, it would be
unreasonable for persons to be highly offended by a loss of privacy in
pursuit of those justifiable interests.9 2 The acceptable loss to privacy,
however, would extend only as far as that minimally required to meet
the competing entity need. 93
The organized health care system parallels the workplace context:
A group of participants is brought together by a shared desire to ob-
tain some benefit conferred by the involved entity and, in the ex-
change, will experience diminished privacy. As with workers, health
care participants must receive some notice qualifying vulnerability.
To bear a resemblance to the collective desire regarding reasonable-
ness of the loss of privacy, the notice must reflect the opposing needs
88. This human propensity toward self-interest that results in gaining access to some
good without a fair pro rata sacrifice presents a "free rider" issue. See Glyn S.
Lunny, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the
Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 859 (2001). Some individu-
als may also be more sensitive to revealing private information - a subjectively
differing scheme that is at the heart of the issue regarding the exchange of pri-
vacy loss and entry into the system.
89. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
90. Employees are often provided actual notice that employers reserve the right to
monitor e-mail correspondence. See Micalyn S. Harris, Is EMail Privacy an Oxy-
moron? Meeting the Challenge of Formulating a Company EMail Policy, 16 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 553, 556-57 (2002). Employer needs to monitor in-
clude a variety of legitimate interests such as avoiding libel and maintaining
worker productivity. Id. at 557.
91. See, e.g., Sanders v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 978 P.2d 67, 69 (Cal. 1999).
92. See, e.g., Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 60 F. Supp. 2d 298 (D. Del. 1999) (drug
testing); Frye v. IBP, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (D. Kan. 1998) (drug testing);
Acuffv. IBP, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 914 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (theft surveillance).
93. E.g., Acuff, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 914 (including jury question as to excessiveness of
surveillance by use of wide-angle lens).
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that warrant the incursions, and the incursions should not extend be-
yond the minimum needed.94
The Privacy Rule, which articulates the contents of the notice95
and permissible incursions,96 should thereby reflect a reasonable bal-
ance.97 In turn, this permits diminished privacy to comport with the
collective desire and signify that privacy has adequately been pro-
tected. Thus, the underlying construct in analyzing whether the Rule
adequately protects the privacy of individual participants will be pre-
mised on a necessity for the invasion of privacy and some notice re-
garding the invasion. Since individuals within an organized health
care system have a reasonable expectation that entities will keep in-
formation confidential,98 notices provide a means whereby individuals
may judge whether to participate in the mini-society using, as crite-
rion, the usage/disclosure quid pro quo. Notice thereby guards privacy
to the extent that individuals may meaningfully decide whether to
participate, understand the exchange, and to the extent that the ex-
change reflects the proper balance.
C. Notice Under the Rule
The importance of this section is that it requires covered entities to
explain to individuals what is offered as the quid pro quo for participa-
tion in the mini-society. Notice is important to encourage participation
in the system, particularly since the technological age allows for intru-
sive gathering and sharing of information at massive rates. Without
notice of data practices, the crucial public trust is unlikely to exist.
For purposes of evaluating the privacy issue, the practices evidenced
in the notice must reflect the appropriate quid pro quo.
It is essential to keep in mind that the main purpose of the HIPAA
authorized regulations is not to ensure the privacy or confidentiality
of medical records, but to reduce the administrative costs of federally
run health care programs. 99 Specifically, the Rule is meant "to im-
94. Gostin and Hodge frame the balance in terms of individual privacy versus the
'common good." Gostin & Hodge, supra note 35, at 1439.
95. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2001).
96. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2001).
97. See Ian Goldberg, et al., Trust, Ethics, and Privacy, 81 B.U. L. REV. 407, 418-19
(2001). The authors focus on "fair information practices" to determine whether
disclosure practices are ethical. Notice, minimization, limited use, and provision
of choice to withhold consent form the main components of what the authors con-
sider fair information practices. Id. Those components are also primary balanc-
ing factors. .
98. Gostin, et al., supra note 13. The Nationalization of Health Information Privacy
Protections, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 1113, 1118 (2002).
99. Final Privacy Rule Preamble - Background and Purpose, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,461 -
82,510 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 - 164), available at
http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/PvcPre)!.htm. (last visited June 1,
2001) (referring to the enabling provisions within § 261 and § 1172(b) of § 262 of
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prove the Medicare program . . ., the Medicaid program. .., and the
efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system by encouraging
the development of a health information system through the estab-
lishment of standards and requirements for the electronic transmis-
sion of certain health information."10 0 This, then, articulates entity
need. The Privacy Rule was mandated because the success of the pro-
gram hinged on its inclusion.l0 1
Formerly, when records were maintained in hard copy files, there
was both a perception of confidentiality and, in reality, a low risk of
breaches of confidentiality due, at least in part, to the expense barrier
of accessing and using those records.' 0 2 As technological advances al-
low for cheap and easy access to records, both perception of vulnerabil-
ity and real exposure to privacy violations increase.1 0 3 Statistics
revealed a high degree of public fear about the transmission and stor-
age of private health information.10 4 This signaled concern that par-
ticipants might not provide accurate health information or submit to
treatment that would expose their private health information unless
they were assured that their private health information would be kept
the enabling statute HIPAA § 262. The Congressional "recommendations" re-
garding health information privacy appear in the same subtitle as the objective of
cost efficiency. HIPAA, § 264, (Subtitle F -Administrative Simplification). This
supports the view that such protections are necessary to promote the overall effi-
ciency objectives.
100. HIPAA, § 261; see also Final Privacy Rule Preamble - Background and Purpose,
65 Fed. Reg. 82,461 - 82,510 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 -
164), available at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/PvcPre)!.htm. (last
visited June 1, 2001) (promoting electronic commerce). Many countries, espe-
cially in Asia, have developed or are currently developing laws in an effort to
promote electronic commerce. These countries recognize consumers are uneasy
with their personal information being sent worldwide. Privacy laws are being
introduced as part of a package of laws intended to facilitate electronic commerce
by setting up uniform rules.
101. Final Privacy Rule Preamble - Background and Purpose, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,461 -
82,510 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 - 164), available at
http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/finalPvcPre)!.htm. (last visited June 1,
2001).
102. Id.
103. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy? 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000)
(contending new technologies devastate privacy).
104. For example, polls show that Americans fear loss of control over private medical
information. Final Privacy Rule Preamble - Background and Purpose, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82,461 - 82,510 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 - 164),
available at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/PvcPre)!.htm (last visited
June 1, 2001); see also Princeton Survey Research Associates, Confidentiality of
Medical Records: National Survey (Summary and Overview) (1999), available at
http://www.chcf.org/documents/ihealthlsurvey.pdf (last visited April 2, 2002).
Fifty-four percent of United States adults believed that the "most serious threat
to medical privacy" stems from the computerization of medical records. Id. Com-
puter hackers posed a major fear. Id.
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confidential.10 5 The Congressional purpose of efficient health delivery
would be impossible without the cooperation of the participants.
Thus, the development of public trust through assurances that privacy
would be maintained was vital to the success of the program. Without
it, individuals would be unwilling to share the very information that is
required.1 0 6 Need, therefore, must be defined in terms of what pri-
vacy must be lost in order to make the system work effectively.
In both the initial final rule and the modified final rule, section
164.520, the Notice provision, obligates covered entities to inform indi-
viduals how information about them may be used and disclosed if they
are to participate in the organized health care management mini-soci-
ety.O 7 Individuals are told, in writing, how the individually identifi-
able health information that they understand to be "protected health
information" may be used and disclosed.108 Notices must describe, in
plain language, potential uses and disclosures, with one use or disclo-
sure example to accompany descriptions in each of three categories:
treatment, payment, and operations. 10 9 Information regarding the in-
dividual's rights and the covered entity's duties, as well as instruc-
tions on how to contact the person providing the notice, must be
listed. 110 In addition, the notice must inform individual participants
that revocable authorizations will be required prior to most other uses
or disclosures."'1
105. See, e.g., Phillip C. Buttell, The Privacy and Security of Health Information in the
Electronic Environment Created by HIPAA, 10 K.N. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 399, 406
(2001).
106. Final Privacy Rule Preamble - Background and Purpose, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,461 -
82,510 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 - 164), available at
http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/PvcPre)!.htm (last visited June 1,
2001); see also Janlori Goldman & Zoe Hudson, Virtually Exposed: Privacy and
E-Health, available at http:/Avww.chcf.org/topicsfview.cfhl?itemID=12562. Trust
is uneven among entities. Americans have been far more likely to trust health
care providers such as physicians and hospitals with their personal information
(60%) than they do government health insurers (35%). Princeton Survey Re-
search Associates, supra note 104.
107. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(a) (2001); 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(a) (2002).
108. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b) (2001); 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b) (2002).
109. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b)(1)(ii)(A)&(B) (2001); 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b)(1)(ii)(A)&(B)
(2002).
110. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b)(1) (2001); 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b)(1) (2002).
111. 164.520(b)(1)(ii)(B)&(E) (2002). Prior to the August, 2002 modification, the notice
would have contained an additional description of each purpose for which no
prior consent or authorization was needed. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2001).
The elimination of the consent provision reflects the removal of any consent re-
quirement in the modified version. Cf. § 164.512 (2001), with § 164.512 (2002).
The 2002 version merely permits consent 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b), presumably to
assure doctors that compliance with the regulations is compatible with physician
ethics. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Informa-
tion, 67 Fed. Reg. 14776, 14779 (March 27, 2002) (describing modifications of pro-
[Vol. 82:741
HIPAA'S PRIVACY RULE
Some weaknesses are evident despite the comprehensive notice re-
quirements. For example, in contrast to consent requirements, notice
provisions provide no functional opportunity for informed discussion
of relevant issues.'1 2 This may be exacerbated by the lack of an obli-
gation to provide notice of uses and disclosures specific to the particu-
lar entity, either in the description or in the example. Instead,
covered entities need only provide "sufficiently detailed" descrip-
tions 113 of uses and disclosures that are permissible under the Rule.
Entities may thereby be encouraged to develop boilerplate laundry
lists and utilize innocuous examples that may mask more controver-
sial uses and disclosures. 114 As a result, the listings may not be par-
ticularly helpful to individual consumers. The document may be too
overbroad to be of much value, or too lengthy for consumers to attempt
to read and understand. Absent awareness, privacy is inadequately
safeguarded.115
The timing of the notice may create a gap between an individual's
understanding of potential uses and disclosures at the time of receipt
and the time when information is gathered, re-configured, and dis-
closed subsequently. This may be exacerbated by the intermittency of
the notice. Notice is only provided at specified intervals such as at the
time of enrollment,11 6 or upon a first visit,117 for example. When indi-
viduals receive subsequent treatment, especially some time after the
original notice, they may not have in mind the specifics that apply to
the current procedure. Given the laundry listing that would be appro-
priate upon initial notice, the individual may lack awareness of the
intensity of the dissemination at the time when a certain level of pri-
vacy may be presumed by the individual but not in reality realized.llS
In essence, the regulatory notice requirements reveal that the cov-
ered entities have extensive control over information dissemination,
posed Rule codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164), available at http'//www.hhs.gov/
ocr/hipaa/propmods.txt (last visited April 2, 2002).
112. Guthrie, supra note 78, at 172. Even the mechanism ascertaining receipt of no-
tice is lax. Id. at 172-73.
113. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b)(1)(ii)(D) (2002).
114. See discussion of marketing strategies infra. Inconsistency between practice and
policy is hardly new. Scott, supra note 22, at 485-86. The generalities permitted
under the Rule appear to allow for a variation on the theme.
115. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 5.
116. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(c)(1)(B) (2002) (for health plans). Health plans must also
provide notice no later than by compliance date for current enrollees and after
material revision. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(c)(1) (2002). All entities must provide no-
tice to any person who requests the information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(c) (2002).
117. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(c)(2) (2002) (for health care providers offering direct treat-
ment). Proof of receipt of the notice provision from providers lies in the written
acknowledgement or the provider's documentation of good faith efforts and expla-
nation of why the acknowledgement was not received. Id. at 520(c)(2)(ii).
118. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 48-49 (describing the consumer belief that health
information enjoys a high level of protection is misplaced and exploited).
20041
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
subject only to the limits of the regulation. These are explained in
greater detail elsewhere in the Rule. To the extent that actual uses
and disclosures of a particular entity do not closely correspond with
the "sufficiently detailed" descriptions and examples, the notice lacks
information relevant to individuals to make subjective-based decisions
trading privacy for benefit. On the other hand, if the descriptions of
permissible disclosures comprise a quid pro quo representing the
trade apropos the collective desire, then it matters not the specific
uses and disclosures made by any particular entity. All that would
matter for privacy to be respected would be that the descriptions re-
flected collective desire. The notice thus performs the dual function of
developing trust through information and inculcating an attitude of
reasonableness. Uses and disclosures made in conformity with the
Rule thereby grant entities immunity from liability because the spe-
cific provisions describe the manner in which privacy may legally be
invaded by the covered entity. The Rule should thereby provide the
objective measure of what would be highly offensive to a reasonable
societal participant.
The analogy works provided that the Rule mirrors the appropriate
quid pro quo of lost privacy for efficient management of the organized
health care system mini-society. This occurs when the incursion on
individual privacy is no greater than necessary to attain the primary
interests of the system. In this case, Congress has defined those inter-
ests as programmatic efficiency and effectiveness in maintaining pub-
lic health.1 19
D. Overview of Privacy Incursions
Section 164.502 of the modified Final Rule sets out the basic rule
regarding uses and disclosures of protected health information.120
The essential message appears to convey a warning to covered entities
to be on guard since use and disclosure is permissible only as de-
scribed. 1 2 1 As details unfold, one has the impression that the primary
function of the regulations focuses not on maintaining individual pri-
vacy, but on offering red light/green light guidance to covered entities.
That is, to specify how to proceed without liability. This impression is
affirmed by the inability of the individual to learn how or to whom
119. See HIPAA, § 261 note; see also Final Privacy Rule Preamble - Background and
Purpose, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,461 - 82,510 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
pts. 160 - 164), available at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/Pvc-
Pre0l.htm (Privacy laws enhance electronic commerce in the United States and
abroad by removing consumer uneasiness); see also David Banisar, Privacy and
Human Rights 2000, at http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2000.
Trust is fostered by protecting privacy interests.
120. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2002).
121. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2002).
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certain of his or her private information has been disseminated122 and
by the absence of a private right of action against any wrongdoing
entity. 123
Section 164.502 organizes the regulatory scheme into ten use and
disclosure categories, the first of which describes the general frame-
work.1 24 Each is discussed in greater detail in subsequent provisions,
as is the scope of disclosure.125 Additional provisions govern how dis-
closures may be made without fear of entity liability when recipients
122. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.528(a) (2002). Three problematic uses or disclosures that are
permitted by section 164.502(a) and to which an individual is not entitled to an
accounting include those made for health care operations, 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.528(a)(1)(i) (2002), those made pursuant to authorization, 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.528(a)(1)(iv) (2002), and when information has been transmitted without
certain personal identifiers, 45 C.F.R. § 164.528(a)(1)(viii) (2002) (referring to the
limited data set of § 164.514(e)).
Covered entities may use PHI to create (or to have business associates create)
limited data sets. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(3)(ii) (2002). The data sets compile
targeted PHI information absent regulation-specified identifiers including
names, street address, phone, fax, and social security numbers, and some other
common identifiers such as those attached to vehicles, photographs, or biometric
identifiers. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2) (2002). Once the information is organized
into data sets, the entity may use or disclose the sets for health care operations.
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(3)(i) (2002).
Although it would appear to be protective of the sensitive information, there is
a back door that enables re-identification. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c) (2002) (codes
may be used to allow for re-identification). Although the drafters acknowledge
transmission and re-identification, the individual is unlikely to become aware of
the dissemination because the regulations also prohibit those who do so to make
contact with the individual. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(5) (2002). Interestingly, the
same passage that prohibits contacting also prohibits the activity that would be
the necessary precursor to the contact. Id.
123. See HIPAA, § 262.
124. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2002). Use and disclosure by a covered entity is permitted
in conjunction with the following stipulations: made to the individual; for treat-
ment, payment, or health care operations; with proper authorization or agree-
ment; when permitted or required by law; for fundraising and underwriting
purposes; when the information is transmitted as a limited data set with certain
direct identifiers removed; and when regulatory-specified safeguards are estab-
lished, including the transmission of only the minimum necessary information in
most instances. Id.
125. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2002). Unless excepted, disclosing entities must make "rea-
sonable efforts to limit protected health information to the minimum necessary to
accomplish the purpose" and must comply with notice provisions, if any are re-
quired. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(i) (2002). Other provisions of section 164.502 require
entities to uphold heightened privacy agreements voluntarily undertaken (c);
permit the creation of de-identified information (d); provide rules regarding those
deceased (f), legally represented by another (g), requesting special means of com-
munication (h), or disclosing as whistleblowers (j). Exceptions are for treatment,
to the individual, in conjunction with most authorizations; to report possible en-
tity wrongdoing, and when the information is required by law for judicial or ad-
ministrative proceedings, domestic violence, or law enforcement purposes. Id. at
502(b).
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are business associates not covered under the regulations.126 Subse-
quent provisions in sections 164.504 through 164.528 primarily ex-
pand on the initial themes and further explain the many exceptions
and exclusions.
1. Disclosures for Treatment, Payment, and Health Care
Operations
Disclosures for treatment, payment, and health care operations are
permissive under the Rule. Therefore, they warrant special attention
in determining whether privacy is adequately safeguarded. The no-
tice must inform individuals that entities have a permissive right to
use and disclose the individual's protected health information for pur-
poses of treatment, payment, and health care operations. To assist
with understanding, the labels must be accompanied by a description
that includes at least one example for each category.12 7
a. Payment
It is fairly obvious that the obligor must provide payment in refer-
ence to the provided care in order to ensure the continued financial
stability of the system and its members. The exchange of information
in support of payment is inevitable to avoid fraud - a primary Con-
gressional interest in imposing the regulatory scheme. Analogous to
the circumstance in the initial final rule where no consent was re-
quired before disclosures connected with payment to indirect provid-
ers, a use or disclosure in pursuit of this interest satisfies the quid pro
quo that would be reasonable as long as the information that were
used or disclosed for payment purposes minimized the exposure of the
participant's private information.
The Rule suggests minimizing individual exposure since its stan-
dard requires that information may be disclosed for purposes of pay-
ment only to the extent that is the minimum necessary.128 Although
strict liability would protect individual privacy to its fullest, as in
other privacy claims, such heightened protection does not exist. Cov-
ered entities are charged with exercising "reasonable efforts to limit
protected health information to the minimum necessary to accomplish
the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or request [for informa-
tion]."129 "Reasonable effort" will be defined in court. Until it is
known how liberal entity disclosure practices will pass muster under
126. Id. at 502(e). Disclosures to business associates under an entity-associate con-
tract are considered to be "regulatory gaps" because the HHS has no authority to
regulate the associates. However, the gap is addressed by requiring entity con-
tracts to maintain confidentiality provisions. Scott, supra note 22, at 524-26.
127. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b)(1)(ii)(A) (2002).
128. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2001); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2002).
129. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1) (2002).
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the court rulings, the extent to which individual privacy rights will be
protected cannot be assessed.130
b. Treatment
As with payment purposes, adequate treatment can occur only
with proper disclosure of private health information.131 Unlike for
payment purposes, reasonable individuals are likely to prefer trusted
health care providers, who already have a duty to maintain patient
confidentiality,13 2 to have access to more rather than less information
in order that accurate diagnoses and treatments can be administered.
Presumably, an individual would agree to far greater exposure of
health information in order to derive the maximum benefit of partici-
pation. Therefore, the collective desire of individual participants
would likely not restrict private health information to the mini-
mum.133 This accords with the Rule standards that except health
care providers from the "minimum necessary standard" when infor-
mation is used or disclosed for treatment purposes.' 3 4 Because the
Rule appears to comport with collective desire, privacy is safeguarded
in the treatment context. 135
c. Health Care Operations
Health care operations includes a host of activities including qual-
ity assessment; reduction of costs; contacting patients about treat-
ment alternatives; evaluating provider and health plan performance;
training non-health care professionals; health insurance contract con-
cerns; and business and administrative activities.136 Special atten-
130. Even commentators whose perspective is oriented toward burdensomeness to in-
dustry find the "reasonableness" provision confusing. See, e.g., Guthrie, supra
note 78, at 166. Clearly, the standard will vary from entity to entity. Kevin B.
Davis, Privacy Rights in Personal Information: HIPAA and the Privacy Between
Fundamental Privacy Rights and Medical Information, 19 J. MARsHALL J. COM-
PUTER & INFO. L. 535, 551 (2001).
131. See Sage, supra note 71, at 1785.
132. See Guthrie, supra note 78, at 158-59.
133. See Gostin, supra note 9, at 28. The trade-off, diminishing autonomous choice, is
desirable when it relates to improving overall health. Id. Therefore, collective
desire may be implied.
134. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(i) (2001); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2)(i) (2002). Other cir-
cumstances in which the minimum necessary standard does not apply include the
following: disclosure to the individual, pursuant to a valid authorization under
limited circumstances; to the HHS Secretary for compliance and complaint inves-
tigations; and for those required by law. Id. A discussion regarding the disclo-
sures required by law could alone be the subject of a paper and is beyond the
scope of this paper.
135. But see Schwartz, supra note 10, at 69-70 (stating treatment provides a unique
opportunity for abusive disclosures).
136. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2002) (defining "health care operations").
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tion should be directed toward health care operations as distinct from
marketing activities to determine whether they represent an appro-
priate quid pro quo of entity control over private information in ex-
change for benefits that individuals receive by participating in the
health care mini-society.
Significantly, marketing generally requires authorization prior to
use or disclosure of private health informationl37 while operations ac-
tivities do not.138 Requiring authorization tacitly acknowledges that,
in the marketing context, entity benefit is the primary focus. Safe-
guarding privacy appears to warrant some individualized control over
information dissemination to overcome the moral hazards created by
industry's conflict-of-interest in making disclosure decisions.139 To
the extent that the Rule mandates individualized control in the con-
text that consumers would collectively consider "marketing," privacy
is protected. As will become apparent, these two activities (marketing
and health care operations) seem to converge. As a consequence, the
individual may very well be confused about the category in which a
particular activity may be included and be unable to take action to
avoid unwanted exposure.
(i). Modified Rule
The modified Rule begins with the standard that covered entities
that wish to use or disclose protected health information for market-
ing purposes must obtain the individual's prior authorization.14o If
the marketing is sponsored by another entity through direct or indi-
rect remuneration to the covered entity, the individual must be fore-
warned by a statement within the authorization document.141 This
standard of permitting the individual to exercise control through in-
formation and choice is consistent with a key privacy protection ingre-
dient. Therefore, on the surface, the Rule appears to adequately
safeguard privacy. Whether the appearance is manifest reality de-
pends upon what is or is not included within the Rule's definition of
"marketing" for which authorization is required and the extent to
which an authorization document must be issued.
The Rule recognizes that communications made for the purpose of
encouraging the individual to purchase or use advertised products or
services are essentially marketing practices. 142 As indicated above,
137. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3) (2002).
138. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1)(ii) (2002).
139. See Goldberg, et al., supra note 97 at 416.
140. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3)(i) (2002). Exceptions to the need for prior authorization
are when the covered entity makes a face-to-face communication or provides a
promotional gift of nominal value. Id.
141. Id. at (ii).
142. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2002) (defining marketing).
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use or disclosure of private information to assist in such practice gen-
erally requires the individual's prior agreement. 14 3 When the covered
entity plans to sell the individual's private information to another en-
tity that makes the marketing communication on its own behalf,144
the authorization document must inform the individual that disclo-
sures will be made in exchange for some sort of remuneration to the
covered entity who holds the private health information. 14 5 The dual
safeguards of knowledge and choice suggest adequate privacy protec-
tion. But does the scope of protection encompass all practices that lay
individuals would consider marketing? What sorts of communications
made for the purpose of encouraging the individual to purchase or use
advertised products or services are excluded from the definition? Are
there circumstances in which disclosures for what lay persons would
consider marketing are permissible under the Rule absent agreement?
Do remunerated disclosures always require the individual's knowl-
edge or prior agreement? To the extent that the answers to the ques-
tions outline exceptions to the standard of no disclosures for
marketing purposes without prior authorization, individual privacy is
undermined.
(ii). Initial Final Rule
It may be helpful to compare the modified rule with its precursor to
determine weaknesses within the Rule and ascertain cures. As in the
modified rule, the marketing definition began with the general pro-
position that marketing communications were those that encouraged
individuals to purchase or use products or services. 146 However,
many communications made by a covered entity to encourage con-
sumer use would not have been considered marketing. 14 7 In addition,
there were some activities considered mere health care operations
that the rule candidly stated were really marketing strategies. As
such, they would not have required the individual's authorization
prior to uses and disclosures made in conjunction with the defined
conduct.148 Communications excluded from the definition of market-
ing and marketing that fell within the rubric of health care operations
will be discussed in turn.
143. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3) (2002).
144. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2002).
145. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (a)(3)(ii) (2002).
146. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001) (defining marketing).
147. Id.
148. Id. (defining "health care operations"). Section 164.514(e) describes what conduct
needs no prior authorization.
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d. Communications Not Considered Marketing
Several types of communication would not have been considered
marketing under the Rule. Purely descriptive information that helped
clarify for the individual what providers were included as part of the
heath plan network would not have been considered marketing. Nor
would descriptive information that informed the individual whether
certain products or services were included within the plan's cover-
age. 149 These were retained in the modified version.150
Such communications have little impact on privacy concerns. The
communication may be general and require no private information
from the individual, or may be a foreseeable response to an individual
regarding specific benefits of participation. The communication alone
impacts no disclosure except when the individual volunteers it. The
communication may impact privacy only in the intrusion sense - that
is, that a person would consider the communication an undesirable
intrusion into his sphere because he does not wish to be approached on
the subject.
Another type of exclusion would have permitted communications
tailored to the individual's circumstances. These could have been
made without authorization or consent under two circumstances: if
made orally or, if written, were not a result of remuneration from a
third party.151 A physician could freely discuss treatment alterna-
tives and provide brochures supplied by companies whose products
were featured therein as long as the outsiders gave no direct or indi-
rect remuneration to the physician for making the communication.152
It would not be considered marketing for a physician to discuss al-
ternative treatments with a patient or to offer the patient brochures or
even samples. The brochures themselves could be designed to induce
selection of their products over others, perhaps because of bulk-buying
benefits, and yet not be considered marketing provided that the mid-
149. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501(6)(v) (2001) (part (6)(v) of the definition of "health care
operations").
150. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501(1)(i) (2002) (part (1)(ii) of the definition of marketing).
151. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001) (defining marketing). This condition attaches to the
descriptive function, but does not impact privacy in the disclosure sense. Instead,
it may eliminate the incentive to direct the individual a product or service that
benefits the entity rather than the individual.
152. Id. It is unclear exactly which covered entity is prohibited from receiving remu-
neration. If a physician is the communicator, is he or she the only covered entity
that may not receive remuneration? Suppose the physician, who is a covered en-
tity on his own, offers services under a health plan. Is the larger health plan
entity also prohibited from receiving remuneration? Of course, the company
could supply samples that might induce the physician to prescribe that particular
brand because of the benefit that passes through the physician directly to the
consumer by way of the free samples.
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dleman physician has received no remuneration. 153 This appears to
be unchanged in the modified version.15 4 So far, no disclosure privacy
issue is at stake because no protected health information is dissemi-
nated to a third party.155 It is only a physician who makes use of
information necessarily in his or her domain to assist the individual in
selecting a course of treatment.
e. Disguised Marketing
Likewise, in the initial and modified versions, a health plan entity
could write to the individual directly and enclose brochures provided
by third parties who supply the advertised goods and services. This
would not be considered marketing even though offered to induce the
individual to change physicians, treatment center, or treatment, as
long as the health plan receives no direct or indirect remuneration.
Instead, it is likely to be considered within the scope of health care
operations where entities are free to contact individuals about treat-
ment alternatives.156
If the communicating entity does receive remuneration, even indi-
rectly, then the communication is generally considered marketing.157
Under the initial rule, remunerated marketing could still fall within
the definition of health care operations if the entity "prominently"
stated that it had or would receive remuneration, identified itself as
the source of the communication, and supplied applicable opt-out in-
formation.158 It could even target the individual.159
Remunerated marketing considered part of health care operations
fell roughly within three categories: face-to-face communications, com-
munications concerning products and services of "nominal value," and
153. Id. Providing alternative suggestions for cheaper remedies has been con-
trovercial in the past. Scott, supra note 22, at 502.
154. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2002) (defining marketing at (1)(ii), (iii)). But see infra
regarding changes.
155. Although disclosure privacy may be intact under these circumstances, the unfet-
tered provision of information risks manipulating the consumer, in part because
they may choose to provide only entity-oriented reduced cost alternatives or cre-
ate demand for particular products or services. Sage, supra note 71, at 1788-89.
Such communications, excluded from authorization requirements, are really a
type of marketing, especially if entities gain the benefits of promoting less expen-
sive items because of favorable contractors. There is a "fine line between infor-
mation and propaganda." Id. at 1789.
156. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001) (part (1) of the definition of "health care operations";
part (2)(ii) of the definition of "marketing"); 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2002).
157. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(3)(i)(B) (2001); 164.501(1)(i) (2002) (part (2) of the defi-
nition of "marketing"). However, if remunerated disclosures result in value-ad-
ded benefits, they could be excluded from the definition of marketing. 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.50 1(1)(i) (2002) (part (1)(i) of the definition of "marketing").
158. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(3) (2001). There is no need for inclusion of an opt-out pro-
vision if the communication is a broad-based mail-out. Id. at 514(e)(3)(i)(C).
159. Id. at 514(e)(3)(ii).
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communications concerning "health-related products and services." 160
The first circumstance, similar to a non-marketing communication,
suggests that the encounter need not have been limited to oral com-
munication. The last appears far broader in that it suggests that cov-
ered entities could mail, e-mail, fax, or phone the individual about a
variety of products and services based on the individual's specific con-
dition. Mail-outs or encounters could have included an extensive dis-
play of product information such as catalogues, fliers, and brochures,
any of which may have been compiled based on remuneration from
advertisers. How is the individual's privacy protected given the per-
missive regulatory provision regarding operational activities?
Let's say that an individual, John Doe, has just visited his physi-
cian for a condition that turns out to be diabetes. Let's imagine fur-
ther that the physician has prescribed a specialized treatment
different than the norm because of another of John's conditions - say
quadriplegia, 16 1 for example - which makes the standard treatment
inappropriate. The unrelated condition would have to be disclosed to
the health plan entity under the "minimal necessary" rule along with
diabetes. Otherwise, the plan would not authorize payment of the
more expensive diabetic treatment. The health plan would now have
protected information related not only to the immediate condition that
needed attention, diabetes, but also to the unrelated condition that
gave rise to the non-standard treatment plan.
Once the larger entity held the information, it could use or disclose
it for health care operations, including marketing as described above.
In preparing its marketing strategy for a mail-out or face-to-face en-
counter, the entity could share protected health information with a
business associate who assisted in some way with the communica-
tion.162 The business associate could be another covered entity such
as a clearinghouse that compiled and organized the information, or it
could be some non-covered entity that assisted in some undisclosed
fashion. John and others could have been organized by type or class
and targeted for mail-outs, e-mails, faxes, or conceivably door-to-door
visits.163 The agent could have been provided a list of names and ad-
dresses and told to discuss specific items tailored to the individual's
needs.
Although sharing information intra-entity or with a business asso-
ciate is held to a "minimum necessary" standard, must it be limited to
160. Id. at 514(e)(2).
161. Quadriplegia should fall within the definition of protected health information be-
cause it is information received by a provider or plan that either relates to one's
physical condition, or for which one received some health care. 45 C.F.R.
§ 160.103 (2001) (defining "health information").
162. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2)(ii) (2001).
163. See Gostin, supra note 9, at 27-28. Such provisions diminish privacy practices.
Id.
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John's diabetic condition? Use or disclosure should be limited to the
"minimum necessary to accomplish the intended purpose."16 4 If the
intended purpose is to make efficient marketing communications sub-
sumed under health care operations, would it not be necessary to and
disclose all of John's conditions absent irrelevant details? The initial
final rule merely required that marketing operations communications
be of nominal value or concern "health-related products and ser-
vices"165 and, if the individual were targeted, that advertised goods or
services "may be beneficial to the health of the type or class of [the]
individual."16 6 There was no proscription or requirement of an indi-
vidualized approach; no standard defining how groups could be formed
or classified; and no minimum qualification or quantification of bene-
fit that might limit disclosures to business associates. Essentially, in-
dustry was left to define its own parameters. 16 7 Individuals could be
lumped into a group in accord with some entity or business associate-
defined classification. John could be placed in a category inclusive of
diabetics, quadriplegics, quadriplegics with diabetes, or perhaps some
other classification that might include other of his health conditions.
The classification then dictated the communications John could re-
ceive under the rubric of heath care operations.
What type of communications could John have received? One
could easily envision an entity sending a flier displaying a variety of
wheelchair models by different companies who paid a fee to be in-
cluded.168 Could the definition of "health-related product" or "health-
related service" also have extended to advertising of specially made
vehicles that were wheelchair friendly, or to home constructors who
specialized in outfitting homes with ramps and other modifications
with the quadriplegic in mind? How far could the standard stretch
before a product or service would be of no health benefit to the type or
class of individuals targeted? Must "health" have included only physi-
cal health? If mental health forms a part of the picture, then, argua-
bly, compiling and sending out information that eased the everyday
difficulties brought about by the physical condition improved overall
164. 45 C.F.R. §164.502(b)(1) (2001).
165. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2)(i)(C) (2001).
166. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(3)(ii)(A) (2001) (emphasis added).
167. Such self-regulation does not adequately safeguard privacy. See Goldberg, et al.,
supra note 97, at 416 (discussing the conflict of interest between a data collector
who wants the information for a particular use and a subject whom the data col-
lector fears will not consent); see also Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/ Infor-
mation Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (2000) (advocating for personal
ownership of information and noting that industry regulation's protection of pri-
vacy was an "abject failure").
168. The entity name might even be viewed as an endorsement of the listed products
and the remuneration notice could be as innocuous as: "We got a great deal on
these products and are passing the savings on to you."
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mental health.169 If one accepted such a broad interpretation, then
the illustrations above would have been permitted under the Rule's
health care operations provisions. Disclosures related to commercial
marketing thereby offers little privacy protection. 170
(i). Modified Rule
Have the potential problems been fixed by the modified Rule? Do
the modifications extend or further retract protections? A seemingly
major change in the regulations was the omission (from the definition
of "health care operations") of activities relating to business manage-
ment and general administrative activities: "marketing for which an
individual authorization is not required as described in
§ 164.514(e)(2)."1 7 1 Section (e)(2) provided that no authorization was
needed for uses or disclosures for marketing communications to the
individual if they were made face-to-face, if it concerned products or
services of nominal value, or if the communication about health-re-
lated products or services adhered to a specified standard.172 The
standard included entity self-identification, indication of any remu-
neration for the marketing communication, an explanation of how the
product or service related to the individual's health if the individual
was specifically targeted, 1 73 and instructions on how to opt out of re-
ceiving future communications. 174
A careful examination of the apparent omission reveals that a sub-
stantial portion has merely been relocated to the revised Section
164.508, which directly deals with authorizations. Therein, face-to-
face communications by a covered entity are excepted from the author-
ization requirement, as are nominal valued promotional gifts.175
Both the former and revised regulations use "nominal value" as a
standard negating the requirement that use or disclosure occur sub-
169. The Rule carries no definition of health. "Health information" relates to "physical
or mental health or condition." 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2001) & (2002) (defining
"health information"). Therefore, the Rule may arguably permit the illustrated
marketing within health care operations.
170. See Gostin, et al., supra note 13, at 1137.
171. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501(6)(v) (2001) (part (6)(v) of the definition of"health care opera-
tions"). Compare the modified version of the definition. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501
(2002).
172. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2)(i) (2001). Disclosures could also be made to assist busi-
ness associates. Id. at 514(e)(2)(ii).
173. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(3) (2001). If targeted, the communication must also ex-
plain why the individual was targeted. Id. at (e)(3)(ii)(B). It is not difficult to
imagine an attractive phrase.
174. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(3)(i)(C) (2001). The opt out clause only requires entities to
make "reasonable efforts" to refrain from making marketing communications to
the complaining individual. Id. at 514(e)(3)(iii). The individual has no recourse
to prevent the spread of his or her personal information. See id.
175. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3)(i) (2002).
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ject to a valid authorization, but the standard is applied differently in
each. In the former, information could be dispersed absent authoriza-
tion if the entity were making a "marketing communication... con-
cern[ing] products or services of nominal value."1 76 The regulatory
language suggests that the total value of the product or service must
be nominal. By contrast, in the modified rule, the limitation concerns
communications in the form of "promotional gift[s] of nominal value
provided by the covered entity."177 The nominal value here relates
only to the sample provided, which may be an inexpensive sample of a
very expensive product. Since the communication concerns a treat-
ment alternative (suggested by the sample), entities are free to dis-
close enrollee information to business associates to generate the
promotional sending under the guise of health care operations.178
Here, unlike the demand-creating brochures that are excluded from
the definition of marketing, demand management is coupled with in-
cursions on disclosure privacy.179 This increases vulnerability to ex-
posure of private information since business associates, unless they
are themselves covered entities, are not governed directly by the
regulations.SO
An individual may welcome a sample directly from the direct
health care provider. That does not mean that the individual
176. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2)(i)(B) (2001) (dovetailing with § 164.501(6)(v) of the defi-
nition of "health care operations").
177. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3)(i)(B) (2002). In both the initial and modified versions of
the final Rule, there was no limitation on subject matter. However, to meet the
§ 164.502(a) standard of dissemination, uses or disclosures must fit within an
enumerated purpose, unless authorized. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2001) &
(2002). But to avoid the authorization requirement that section 164.508 specifi-
cally allows, it would need to fit within the permissive structure - most notably,
within the definition of health care operations. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1)(ii)
(2002). Health care operations is a natural fit. It includes activities aimed at
reducing costs, which by implication would include the development of mass
mailings of samples to encourage use of the cheapest costing products in accord
with contracts with suppliers of the samples. It also permits contact with the
individual for treatment alternatives, implying a health-related matter. 45
C.F.R. § 164.501 (2002). Dissemination of private health information for pur-
poses of accomplishing the operations purposes requires no authorization; it is
permissive. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1)(ii) (2002).
178. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i) (2002). Similar practices of inducing patients to
switch to cheaper medications has been controvercial in the past. Scott, supra
note 22, at 502.
179. See Sage, supra note 71, at 1788-89 (discussing information tools used to
persuade).
180. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2002). Business associates fall outside the scope of the
regulatory agency's authority as granted by Congress (unless they are also them-
selves statutorily-controlled entities independent of their business associate con-
tracts). Therefore, the Rule is limited to requiring covered entities who disclose
information to business associates to have written documentation of'satisfactory
assurance that the business associate will appropriately safeguard the informa-
tion." 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i), (e)(2) (2002).
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welcomes the spread of private health information in exchange for the
gift.181 By definition, the cost of the gift is very low to the providing
entity. The cost to the individual might be greater than the gift is
worth, given increased vulnerability to exposed privacy. Because the
revised regulation focuses on the de minimis value of the gift sample
rather than the total value of the product or service offered, the entity
has an incentive to disseminate and aggregate private health informa-
tion to facilitate its promotional gift giving. As there is no limit on the
quantity of promotional mailings that may occur, an entity may seek
to maximize its profit by multiple disclosures that result in multiple
remunerated mailings without a charge of non-compliance with the
privacy regulations.
Since the promotional gift falls outside the scope of requiring au-
thorization (as long as the covered entity is the gift provider),1 82 then
there may be no requirement that an individual learn about any re-
muneration to the entity by the product manufacturers or service
coordinators. The reason for the lack of knowledge is that the regula-
tions seem to provide for remuneration notice within authorizations
separate from the communication, '8 3 which are not required for pro-
motional gifts.184 This is consistent with the initial final Rule insofar
as disclosure of some marketing is permissive.i8 5
An entity that discloses private health information without prior
authorization in order to make promotional gifts may then follow up
by making recommendations to the individual to use those same prod-
ucts and services without the authorization or remuneration require-
ments attached to marketing communications.186 The reason for this
anomaly is that entity recommendations for alternative treatments
and exclusive offerings of health-related products and services to
181. This reflects the double-headed issue of service versus exploitation. Schatz,
supra note 66, at 687.
182. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3)(i)(B) (2002).
183. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(3)(ii) (2002) ("If the marketing involves direct or indirect
remuneration to the covered entity from a third party, the authorization must
state that such remuneration is involved"). It is unclear whether a specific refer-
ence to remuneration must appear within the formal Notice. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.520(b)(1) (2002).
184. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(3)(i)(B) (2002) (stating authorization not required for de
minimis promotional gifts).
185. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001) (part (v) of the definition "health care operations")
in conjunction with 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2)(i)(B) (2001), which negated the au-
thorization requirement for the marketing of nominal valued goods and services
and placed the activity within the purview of the permissive health care
operations.
186. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501(1) (2002) (parts (1)(i) and (1)(ii) of the definition of"mar-
keting"); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2002) (defining "health care operations")
and (stating permissive disclosure is permitted if culminating in contact about a
treatment alternative).
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health plan enrollees falls outside the definition of marketing. 8 7 The
modified final Rule provides that communications describing health-
related products or services are not marketing if they are "available
only to a health plan enrollee that add value to, but are not part of, a
plan of benefits."18 8 That means that a plan can offer a set of products
or services at a cheaper price to enrollees, thereby adding value be-
cause individuals would not be eligible for the special price except for
enrollment.
The activity would be subsumed within health care operations.' 8 9
Therefore, no authorization would be required prior to disclosure of
information that generated the communication, and no apparent no-
tice regarding possible remuneration from the manufacturer or ser-
vice coordinator to the entity would be required.190 Interestingly, the
new regulations appear to have abandoned the earlier version's re-
quirement that individuals who are targeted be told about entity
targeting strategies. 19 1 Instead, the communications appear to fall
within the scope of health care operations19 2 and would be subject
only to requirements attached to those activities. Under both the ini-
tial and modified rules, permissive disclosures as part of health care
187. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2002) (parts (1)(i) and (1)(ii) of the definition of'market-
ing"). Communications are not considered marketing if they are about "health-
related products or services available only to a health plan enrollee that add
value to, but are not part of, a plan of benefits." Id.
188. Id.
189. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2002). "Health care operations" includes the ambiguous
"related functions that do not include treatment" as well as contacting individu-
als about treatment alternatives. Id. Read together, the definition would allow
for entities, within the permissive context of operations activities, to explore a
means of reducing its costs by maintaining some uniformity of medication among
enrollees, even if the product sample might not be the best health choice for the
recipient enrollee.
190. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2002). A cautious covered entity might wish to guard
against possible suits by seeking authorization from enrollees for the marketing
strategies described. If the authorization is sought at the time of enrollment, it is
likely that individuals will not be fully cognizant of the implications. How many
people actually read entire documents - even those they are asked to sign? The
"plain language" requirement, 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(3) (2002), does not guaran-
tee an understanding of what is being asked, particularly when combined with
the presentation of other documents, and detached from the diagnosis or treat-
ment of a health condition. This would be true unless section 164.520 were inter-
preted to require remuneration specifics.
191. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(3)(ii) (2001).
192. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501(2002). Falling outside of the definition of "marketing" is
not why uses or disclosures may occur. Instead, they occur because they fall
within the permissive provisions of health care operations. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.502(a) (2002).
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operations threatens patient privacy and blurs the line between
medicine and marketing.193
How do these changes affect the operations non-marketing market-
ing contacts between the covered entities and our hypothetical John
Doe?
(ii). Application
Unlike the initial version of the final rule, which required notice of
remuneration at the time operations marketing communication were
made, 19 4 the modified version required but a single notice at the time
an authorization was sought (which could have occurred in conjunc-
tion with other signed documents at the time of enrollment), 195 or pos-
sibly no notice at all.196 Consequently, John might not know that the
entity-sent product samples targeting him or the face-to-face counsel-
ing from a member of the entity (either in person or via door-to-door
communication) could be motivated by entity gain rather than individ-
ual benefit. The focus on the nominal value of a sample conjoined with
crossover between entity and individual benefit appears to increase
the entities' desire to disseminate information for its own gain. In
turn, this could increase John's vulnerability to privacy breaches de-
spite the retention of the standard that uses or disclosures are limited
to the minimum necessary.19 7 Moreover, since modifications removed
193. See Scott, supra note 22, at 502-03 (noting the tension between industry and pri-
vacy advocates in striking the proper balance between patient interests and
profit motive).
194. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(3)(i)(B) (2001).
195. Note the compounding allowances, 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3) (2002), and the ab-
sence of timing requirements in the implementation specifications of section
164.508(c).
196. Absent the need for authorization, John may receive no notice of any remunera-
tion that the entity may have received from the supplier. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.508(a)(3) (2002). Notification of remuneration occurs within authorization
documents. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3)(ii) (2002). If no authorization is required
for the marketing (as provided by § 164.508(a)(3)(i)(B) (2002)), then the individ-
ual will not receive remuneration information unless the entity voluntarily pro-
vides it. It is unclear the extent to which the notice document itself would require
individuals to be specifically informed. It must contain sufficient information to
put the individual "on notice" about the kind of dissemination that is permitted to
occur in the absence of specific authorization. Required information includes a
general description of disclosures in connection with operations, activities, and a
description of "other purposes." 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b)(1)(ii) (2002). However,
there is no requirement that it be contained in a separate statement that would
call attention to the permissive uses and disclosures. 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.520(b)(1)(iii) (2002). Thus, descriptions sufficiently detailed to provide the
requisite notice are also likely to be sufficiently detailed to inhibit reading.
197. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2002); 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(d)(1) (2002). The modified
Rule includes an additional section regarding permissive use of a limited data set
in conjunction with research, health information, or health care operations. 45
C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(1), (3) (2002). It may find its greatest application in the re-
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the requirement of a remuneration notice with each mail out, John
might not realize that the product and service information he received
was remunerated. Nor would it trigger an understanding of a distinc-
tion between products and services for his treatment benefit, and
those marketed not primarily for his benefit. The blurring of the
treatment/marketing line suggests an inability to recognize what dis-
closures were permissive, over which John had no control, and those
made pursuant to an authorization, which John could potentially
revoke.198
2. Participants' Ability to Self-Protect
Suppose John found it embarrassing to receive the solicitations
and greatly upsetting that his private affairs concerning his health
conditions were passed on to others within or outside the communicat-
ing entity. Could John exercise some privacy right to limit the com-
munication or dissemination?
One of the hallmarks of privacy is that a person has control over
the dissemination of information about him or herself.199 Thus, not-
withstanding the grant of permission by the Rule for entities to dis-
close protected health information to their business associates for the
purpose of advertising products and services of potential benefit to
targeted individuals, no violation of privacy occurs if John may limit
the disclosures himself.
If John could exercise opt out rights, he could exercise control over
his own affairs and thereby preserve his privacy. Apparently in ac-
cord with this principle, the initial final rule mandated certain opt out
rights in order for a marketing communication to retain its status as a
health care operation. 20 0 Each marketing communication, unless of a
general nature with broad based distribution, required instructions on
how to opt out.20 1 But the opting out provision was limited to cur-
search context, which needed some of the data removed when de-identified. See
INST. FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH AND POLICY, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY,
HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO FEDERAL
STANDARDS FOR PRIVACY ON INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH INFORMATION 18
(2002), available at httpJ/www.healthprivacy.org (last visited Dec. 6, 2002). It is
unclear how the use of limited data sets could affect health care operations. Its
use is not mandatory, but rather is permissive. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(3) (2002).
As applied to operational activities, the failure to exclude some potential re-iden-
tification data from the data set presents problematic privacy issues. See INST.
FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH AND POL'Y, supra note 197.
198. An individual has a right to revoke an authorization if the entity has not acted in
reliance. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(5) (2002).
199. See INNESS, supra note 27, at 57.
200. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001) (part (6)(v) of the definition of "health care opera-
tions"); 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2)(C), (3)(i)(C) (2001).
201. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(3)(i)(C) (2001).
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tailing future communications. 20 2 Once John had expressed his inter-
est in being free of the harassing solicitations, the entity was only
required to make "reasonable efforts to ensure that individuals who
decide [d] to opt out of receiving future marketing communications...,
[weire not sent such communications." 20 3 This was analogous to the
privacy rights preserved by the common law intrusion upon seclusion
tort 204 and did not address concerns relating to the disclosure aspect
of his privacy interests. Thus, while John's embarrassment in receiv-
ing communications may have been alleviated, his concern over the
information flow was not addressed.
Under the modified rule, John's only real hope is to read carefully
and refuse to grant authorization, or attempt to trace communications
to authorizations and seek to revoke them. There is no opt-out provi-
sion that could curtail the communications.
Are there any other rights that John could exercise to limit or in-
terrupt the flow of his private health information where it concerns
marketing?
John does have a right to request that entities limit uses and dis-
closures of his private health information. 205 The Rule's choice of the
word "request" symbolizes that power and control rest in the holder,
and not in John, the person whose private matters are revealed or
withheld by the holding entity. As the word choice implies, John's re-
quest need not be honored.206 This may be true even if a covered en-
tity has agreed to restrict some use or disclosure at John's request.
The entity is not bound to comply if the disclosures are, under certain
circumstances, legally permissible or required. 20 7 The agreement
202. Id. at 514(e)(3)(iii).
203. Id.
204. Makdisi, supra note 30, at 989.
205. 45 C.F.R. § 164.522(a)(1) (2001) & (2002). This right must also be stated in the
notice. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b)(iv)(A) (2001) & (2002).
206. 45 C.F.R. § 164.522(a)(1)(ii) (2001) & (2002).
207. 45 C.F.R. § 164.522(a)(1)(v) (2001) & (2002). Even if an entity agrees to block
uses or disclosures, the agreement is ineffective "to prevent uses or disclosures
permitted or required under §§ 164.502(a)(2)(i), 164.510(a) or 164.512." Section
164.502(a)(2)(i) refers to an individual's right of access to his or her record and to
the individual's right to discover to whom the entity has made disclosures about
the individual. Section 164.524 denies an individual access to, inter alia, psycho-
therapy notes, litigation disclosures, certain clinical disclosures, information
from someone other than a health care provider that was received under a confi-
dentiality agreement with the person supplying the information, and when dis-
closure to the individual in specified contexts would result in substantial harm.
Section 164.528 denies an individual a right to discover what information has
been disclosed (and to whom) provided consent was granted or was not required,
such as when information is exchanged between two health care providers (refer-
ring to § 164.502 and § 164.506); provided disclosure had been authorized (refer-
ring to § 164.502); or provided that the individual had a prior opportunity (oral
notification and response suffices) to restrict directory entries and information
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with John would be void, for example, if the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration were tracking a product prescribed to John,208 or if John were
at risk of contracting or spreading a communicable disease for which
an alert had been issued to the entity.2 09
Disclosures made contrary to a private agreement between John
and an entity would be quite damaging to John's subjective view of his
privacy. This would be particularly true if John were left in the dark
regarding the potential disclosures 210 or if John had chosen to seek
medical care premised on the belief that his private health informa-
tion would be held in strictest confidence based on the agreement. 2 11
Nevertheless, the privacy model is not the subjective, but objective
view as measured by what would be a collective desire. The collective
desire might regard such disclosures as reasonable or even necessary
to the framework of general social life. Therefore, privacy in that
global sense might be adequately protected under the discussed limi-
tations, which do not permit contra-agreement disclosures for market-
ing purposes.
flow to those involved with the individual's care or payment (referring to
§ 164.510). The individual also may not curtail legally required disclosures in-
cluding instances of abuse, neglect or domestic violence; disclosures pertinent to a
judicial or administrative proceeding; or those made to law enforcement for some
purposes. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512. It is apparent that an individual may not limit
such disclosures, notwithstanding any restriction agreements with covered
entities.
208. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(iii)(B) (2001) & (2002).
209. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(iv) (2001) & (2002).
210. This would depend on how well he reads and understands the notice provisions,
and whether the notice contains information relevant to the voidability of restric-
tion agreements. There appears to be no requirement that disclosures made con-
trary to the restriction agreement be disclosed to the individual with whom the
agreement is made. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.522 (2002). It is unclear whether the
notice must include this information. The notice must contain "[a] description of
each of the other purposes for which the covered entity is permitted or required
by this subpart to use or disclose protected health information without the indi-
vidual's written consent or authorization." 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2001)
& (2002) (except that in the modified version, the word "consent" is dropped since
consent is no longer required for any uses or disclosures). Even if the examples
above fall within "other purposes," would the supplied description sufficiently no-
tify John, particularly if the notice were provided two or three years earlier, at a
time that John had no knowledge of his current condition?
211. Seeking care because individuals had trust in entity maintenance of confidential-
ity is an important concern of Congress in developing the Rule. See Preamble,
supra note 10. An additional privacy issue regards information placed in the files
of an individual by one other than a provider. If there is a confidentiality agree-
ment between the informant and the entity and the informant's identity could be
discerned, then the individual about whom the information was about could not
access it. He might not even be aware of its existence. Nor would he have the
opportunity to challenge its truth. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(v) (2001) &
(2002).
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The above discussion suggests that there is no meaningful mecha-
nism by which an individual has control over the dissemination of his
or her private information.212 If John cannot control the dissemina-
tion, could he at least follow the path of dissemination to discover the
extent of his vulnerability or to preserve any remedy rights in the
event that inappropriate disclosure has occurred? Under the Rule,
John has a right to receive an accounting of disclosures. 2 13 This is
another one of the specified individual rights of which individuals
must be informed by the notice.2 14 If one examines the accounting
standard as defined by section 164.528, the right appears to be
broadly inclusive since it encompasses disclosures made during the six
years prior to the request. 2 15 Note, however, that the accounting right
does not include the right to trace the path of intra-entity "uses."2 16
This absence may be unimportant if the standards governing uses do
not violate privacy as determined by the collective desire. Of real im-
port, on the other hand, are the exceptions to the standard.
Three exceptions severely curtail John's accounting rights. The
first excepts accounting of disclosures made for purposes of treatment,
payment, and operations. 217 Since entities may share information
with business associates for health care operations, including market-
ing as discussed above, John has no means of learning about the ex-
tent of sharing or the identities of the recipients. 2 18 Under the
modified rule, John's rights are similarly curtailed by the inability to
be informed about disclosures pursuant to authorization.219 Despite
the absence of such need on its face (since John must have authorized
the disclosures), the authorization may have been timed such that
John could not recognize how the authorization translated into spe-
cific disclosures or communications. 2 20 Finally, the right to an ac-
counting does not include disclosure of limited data sets, despite their
212. Inness points out that privacy is not lost merely because of our desire to keep the
information secret. It may only be lost if the content of the information itself is
truly private. INNESS, supra note 27, at 58-59. With respect to health informa-
tion, there is no dispute that the information is the "secret" type over which one
should have an expectation of privacy, as acknowledged in the Rule itself. See
Preamble, supra note 10 and definitions. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001) (defining
"individually identifiable health information").
213. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b)(1)(iv)(E) (2001) & (2002).
214. Id. Another specified individual right just discussed was the right to request re-
strictions on certain uses and disclosures.
215. 45 C.F.R. § 164.528(a)(1) (2001) & (2002).
216. Id. The standard refers to disclosures and not to uses. Id.
217. 45 C.F.R. § 164.528(a)(1)(i) (2001) & (2002).
218. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2002), which does not require disclosure of the extent or
identities of information recipients. See also note 122.
219. 45 C.F.R. § 164.528(a)(1)(iv) (2002). This was not an exception in the final rule.
45 C.F.R. § 164.528(a)(1) (2001).
220. See discussion supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text.
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peculiar problem of potential re-identification.22 1 In short, John's
ability to track the dissemination of his private health information is
extremely limited. This may even be compounded if John were not the
named "insured," because he may not have received a notice of entity
sharing policies unless he were savvy enough to have requested the
information on his own.2 22
If John cannot trace the path of dissemination, may he find a
source of relief that his private information has a final destination in
the entity's business associates? No Business associates may use or
disclose private health information pursuant to a contract with a cov-
ered entity223 "if the covered entity obtains satisfactory assurance
that the business associate will appropriately safeguard the
information."22 4
Suppose that, despite the obstacles, John were successful at deter-
mining that an improper disclosure had occurred. 22 5 What would be
John's remedy? Possibly none. Any right enforceable under the com-
mon law might be preempted, 226 and John has no private right of ac-
tion under the Rule. Instead, penalties are assessed by the HHS
Secretary.22 7 There are no penalties for negligent disclosures if cor-
rected within thirty days after the negligence is or should have been
discovered. 228 Correction may be accomplished by taking reasonable
steps to cure, terminating contracts with associates who do not cure
material breaches, or, if termination were not feasible, reporting the
problem to the Secretary.2 29
Since the remedy structure is unsatisfactory, could John end all
the information flow by simply dis-enrolling from a plan and enrolling
somewhere else? Such evasive action would likely be unsuccessful.
Private health information may be used and disclosed by covered enti-
ties for health care operations, and those entities may share informa-
221. 45 C.F.R. § 164.528(a)(1)(viii) (2002). See discussion supra note 122 regarding
the impact of limited data sets. Data sets were not part of the initial final Rule.
222. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(c)(1)(iii) (2001) & (2002). Only the named insured must
be provided notice absent specific request. Id.
223. 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(2) (2002).
224. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i) (2002).
225. History tells us that improper disclosures did not necessarily result from com-
puter transgressions; some of the worst infractions were due to human error. See
Davis, supra note 130, at 539. This augments the problems of lack of control over
business associates.
226. 42 U.S.C. 1320d-7 (1996). Preemption promises to be a huge issue as state pri-
vacy laws are interpreted in conjunction with the Rule. See Starr, supra note 9,
at 201.
227. HIPPAA, § 262 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7; 45 C.F.R. 160.203). The Secre-
tary, in turn, has delegated the imposition of monetary penalties to the Director
of the Office for Civil Rights. 65 Fed. Reg. 82,381 (Dec. 28, 2000), available at
http'//www.aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/PvcFR.htm (last visited June 1, 2001).
228. HIPAA, § 262 (administrative simplification).
229. 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(1)(ii) (2002).
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tion with other entities with relationships with the individual, either
currently or in the past. 2 3 0 This means that an individual is unable to
eliminate undesired transmission of private information even if he or
she switches to a new provider or health plan schema. While it may
be desirable for treatment and diagnosis purposes, it does not seen
part of the quid pro quo when it concerns operational activities of the
entity, particularly since all the disclosures may occur without even
the consent of the individual.231 The former regulations required an
individual to at least consent to provider disclosures for treatment,
payment, and operations. 2 32 In the revised regulations, consent is not
required.233
Moreover, uses and disclosures may continue to ever larger groups
of business associates of business associates as long as each, in turn,
includes a disclosure provision in their contract that also provides
"reasonable assurances" of adhering to the Rule.234 With each use or
disclosure, the private information becomes increasingly more vulner-
able to negligent or intentional unpermitted disclosures or other un-
authorized retrievals of the information. To curtail the increasing
exposure, individuals should be provided information with communi-
cations that enables the individual to have some ability to trace and
limit the information flow, and be granted an option to opt out of the
benefit specific to all practices an unsophisticated consumer would
consider marketing. These primarily benefit the entity rather than
the individual's health care that was the quid pro quo in the exchange
resulting in the loss of control over private information. To permit
less fails to fulfill the collective desire and thereby fails to protect
privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
Payment purposes have practicalities having to do with fair ex-
changes and with governmental purposes of fraud prevention and sys-
tem efficiency. Treatment purposes have lingering paternalism.
Doctors still know best. In order to properly diagnose and treat, infor-
mation should not be withheld. This is the essential trust relationship
between a learned professional and lay client. In both instances, de-
spite any worrisome consent issues that linger, the quid pro quo be-
tween lost privacy and benefit gained from entry into the organized
health care mini-society appears to protect privacy to the extent prac-
tical and has the semblance of collective desire as measured by objec-
tive reason.
230. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(1), (4) (2002) (emphasis added).
231. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b) (2002).
232. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a) (2001) (stating provider needed to obtain consent).
233. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b) (2002).
234. 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(2), (4)(ii)(B)(1) (2002).
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Operations purposes do not appear to reflect the objective reason
necessary for a collective desire. Need as defined by Congress in-
cludes the reduction of governmental cost in running federal health
care programs as well as increasing efficiency. Arguably, encouraging
participants to use cheaper treatments by providing samples and
treatment recommendations comporting with favorable entity-sup-
plier contracts suggests condoning unfettered dissemination to accom-
plish that purpose. 23 5 On the surface, then, tort-like balancing may
not appear to favor disclosure limitations, even in the context of com-
mercial marketing. However, that simplistic formula fails to consider
other important balancing factors. The absence of meaningful choice
regarding dissemination practices, an entity's driving profit motive as
the real reason behind its practices, 23 6 and a need for the development
of trust suggest that the broad disclosure practices permitted under
the Rule do not provide an objective measure of reasonableness, 2 37
particularly in the context of marketing disguised as health care
operations.
If marketing continues to be disguised under operational activities,
accounting rights should be enlarged to re-include disclosures made
pursuant to authorization. Consumer confusion and attenuation be-
tween authorizations and activity imply this need. This is especially
true since notices that provide boilerplate laundry lists may not be
helpful to increase a participant's understanding of actual disclosure
practices, which may include remunerated activity. Each communica-
tion that an unsophisticated participant would consider marketing
should include the initial final rule's requirements of remunerated no-
tice at the time of a marketing communication as well as an explana-
tion of how to pursue opt-out rights.
The Rule should be adjusted to restrict disclosures for marketing
purposes that are disguised as health care operations. Those practices
essential for entities as a whole should remain in the current realm of
permissive disclosures. Essential operational features that vary
among entities should be separately addressed in order that the mar-
ketplace dictate which entities should survive. If the collective desire
would place a higher value on privacy over specific benefits gained by
varied entities, then the marketplace will reflect the nature of the ser-
vices in exchange for lost privacy.
Finally, uses and disclosures in the context of all practices that
consumers would deem "marketing," regardless of the technical defini-
235. Physicians may even have a duty to reduce costs. Sage, supra note 71, at 1753.
236. Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust Response, 26
J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL'Y & LAw 939 (2001); see also Sidney D. Watson, Com-
mercialization of Medicaid, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 53, 61 (2001) (discussing how
Medicaid is dominated by for-profit entities).
237. Gostin, supra note 9, at 34-35.
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tion of that practice' as a "health care operation," should have a mean-
ingful opt-in238 or, at a minimum, an opt-out rider. The opt-out
provision should be more liberal than what was in the initial final
rule. The opt-out provisions should all be converted from harassment
opt-out to disclosure opt-out. In addition, the means by which a person
should be able to opt out should be easy to find and easy to accomplish.
Only then may a person's privacy be protected.
238. See James Molenaar, supra note 12. Unless authorization signaling the opt-in
provision is provided in a manner designed to provide the consumer with a full
understanding of how his or her private information is disseminated, the option's
helpfulness would be minimal.
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